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Abstract
With the rapid development of embedded technology and mobile computing, we have
seen a growing number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices on the market. As the number
of wearable devices belonging to the same user increases rapidly, secure pairing between
legitimate devices becomes an important research problem. In this chapter, we propose
the first gait-based shared key generation system that assists two devices to generate a
common secure key by exploiting the user’s unique walking pattern. The system is based
on the fact that sensors on different positions of the same user exhibit similar accelerom-
eter signal when the user is walking. Therefore, the acceleration can be used as a shared
secret information to generate a common key on different devices independently. Our
experimental results show that the key generated by two independent devices on the
same body is able to achieve 100% bit agreement rate. The proposed key generation
protocol can establish a 128-bit key in 5 s (about 10 steps) with entropy varying from 0.93
to 1. We also find that the proposed scheme can run in real time on modern smartphone
and require low system cost.
Keywords: wearable devices, authentication, key generation, system implementation,
evaluation
1. Introduction
With recent advances in wireless sensor networks and embedded computing technologies,
wearable and implantable devices such as smartphone, smartwatch and pacemaker have
become increasingly popular and play significant roles in our daily lives. For users, it is of
potentially great value to associate a personal device with another device in a spontaneous
© 2019 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
manner, i.e. without need for pre-configuration between two legitimate devices. Pairing
devices can be used for the purpose of short-lived interactions, for example, file transfer and
synchronization, or aimed at longer lived pairing, for example, pairing a smartphone with
accessories.
The wireless nature of the communication between devices gives rise to problems of authenti-
cation and security [1]. Figure 1 presents an example of on-body devices with potential
adversaries. An adversary can listen to the communication between legitimate devices and
eavesdrop private information. Traditional security mechanisms rely on cryptographic keys to
support integrity and confidentiality services. Usually, two parties will first establish a com-
mon key, and then use the key to encrypt/decrypt subsequent communications between these
two devices. In a dynamic mobile environment, mobile devices need to establish point-to-point
association frequently. However, it is difficult to ensure the availability of a certificate authority
or a key management center. Therefore, it is necessary to have alternative method for key
distribution between mobile devices without resorting to a fixed infrastructure.
In current mobile systems, this is achieved by key exchange methods, which are either manual
(e.g. typing in the key in a keypad) or exploit key-exchange algorithms. For the first case, a
common mechanism for peer device authentication is personal identification number (PIN) code
entry by the user into the involved devices [2]. Another example is that the user needs to make
sure two devices show the same PIN code on the display when pairing devices using Bluetooth.
However, a primary requirement for human-involved authentication is ease of use and can
interact with another device without much user intervention. Such methods offer a reasonably
secure way of establishing a common key, but can only be acceptable for occasional use. The
number of pairing between wearable devices can be expected to grow considerably as mobile
Figure 1. Legitimate device vs. adversary device.
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devices are becoming increasingly pervasive. Therefore, the human-involved authentication
method is undesirable when users seek to engage in fast and short-lived authentications
frequently. To address the problem of pairing devices frequently, one can save the secure key
on the device and use it next time. However, this method cannot ensure the security of the key
because the stored key can be stolen. On the other hand, due to the small form factor and user
interface (UI) of wearable devices, such method is not well suitable because wearable devices
are not assumed to include screen and keyboard, e.g. pacemaker and health monitor. For the
key-exchange algorithm, a common key exchange method is Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol
which is used to distribute a symmetric key between two parties [3]. However, the premise of
DH protocol is that two devices to be paired together are legitimate devices. It cannot be used
to distinguish adversary device with legitimate devices.
In this chapter, we propose and implement a shared secret key generation protocol for smart
wearable devices based on gait. Gait refers to a person’s manner of walking [4]. The intuition
of the proposed key generation protocol is that devices on the same body experience similar
signals when the user is walking. Therefore, the similar signals can be used to generate a
shared secret key between legitimate devices. The proposed protocol provides an intuitive,
unobtrusive method to pair wearable devices when they are on the same body. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first work to generate a key for wearable devices based on gait. The
main contributions of this paper are two-fold:
1. Shared key generation protocol: We present a novel, lightweight key generation protocol
for wearable devices based on gait signals. We experimentally demonstrate that the keys
generated on two separate wearable devices on the same body can achieve a 100% bit
agreement rate. The proposed key generation protocol is able to generate a 128-bit key
with entropy varying from 0.93 to 1 by walking 5 s (≈10 steps).
2. Implementation: We implement the proposed key generation protocol on modern
smartphone. We report system overhead such as processing time and power consump-
tion, and demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed protocol for use in contemporary
wearable devices.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We first introduce system model in Section 2.
Then we specify the shared key generation protocol in Section 3. We evaluate the performance
of the proposed key generation protocol in Section 4 and implement the system in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the chapter.
2. System model
We envision the use of the proposed system primarily for pairing wearable and implantable
devices such as smartphone, smartwatch and pacemaker. Figure 2 illustrates a typical user model:
a user wants to read private health information from pacemaker (Bob) through a smart watch
(Alice). He walks several steps, and then Alice and Bob generate a shared secret key by exploiting
the gait signals. The key is then used to encrypt/decrypt the messages between two parties.
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3. Design overview
In this section, we will provide an overview of the proposed scheme. Figure 3 illustrates the
flowchart of the key generation protocol. Suppose Alice (smartphone) wants to read data from
Bob (pacemaker). Alice first broadcasts a REQ request to Bob. After receiving REQ, Bob replies
a ACK message back to Alice. Then Alice and Bob start to collect data and follow the steps
shown in Figure 3 to generate a shared secret key. Finally, the key is used to secure the
subsequent communication between Alice and Bob. The key component of the proposed
scheme consists of the following two steps:
1. Signal processing. Signal processing consists of two steps: temporal alignment and spatial
alignment. Temporal alignment is used to synchronize acceleration samples at Alice and
Bob. Spatial alignment is used to transform the acceleration data to the same coordinate
system to facilitate key generation.
Figure 2. System model.
Figure 3. System flowchart.
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2. Key generation. The key generation phase is composed of three parts: quantization, recon-
ciliation and privacy amplification. In quantization stage, Alice and Bob convert their
observed information into bits. In reconciliation stage, Alice and Bob exchange some
information to agree on the same bit string. Finally, privacy amplification technique is used
to diminish the partial information eavesdropped by Eve.
In the following sections, we will describe design details of each component in turn.
3.1. Signal processing
In this section, we describe spatial alignment which is used to transform the original acceleration
data into the same coordinate system and temporal alignment which addresses the problem of
synchronization.
3.1.1. Spatial alignment
Walking is inherently a three-dimensional movement. 3D acceleration data cannot be directly
used for key generation because they are recorded at different locations and orientations. We
address this problem by transforming accelerometer data of different devices to the same
reference coordinate system. Figure 4 shows the definition of device coordinate system, the
global coordinate system, and the body reference coordinate system. We define the world
coordinate system by North, East and the Earth gravity (G). The device coordinate system is
defined as (X, Y, Z). The user plane of motion is defined as forward-sideway plane that is
perpendicular to gravity. Sideway points to the right side of the body’s forward direction. Take
smart watch as an example, assume the linear acceleration signals along three orthogonal
directions of smart watch are Acc_x, Acc_y and Acc_z, respectively, the linear acceleration in
the body reference system can be calculated by the following equation:where Acc_X’, Acc_Y’
and Acc_Z’ are linear acceleration along gravity direction, forward direction and sideway
direction in the body reference system. R is the rotation matrix from the device coordinate
Figure 4. The different coordinate systems: the coordinate system of device is defined as (X, Y, Z). The world coordinate
system is defined as (E, N, G). The user plane of motion is the forward-sideway (F-S) plane, which is the plane
perpendicular to gravity.
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system to the world coordinate system and can be obtained by the method in [5]. The authors
in [5] proposed a method to reliably and accurately estimate the user orientation in different
environments at arbitrary phone positions and orientations. Their proposed method first fuses
different phone inertial sensors to obtain the phone orientation and then applies principal
component analysis (PCA) to improve the final accuracy. After obtaining the acceleration in
body coordinate system, we use Acc_X’, Acc_Y’ and Acc_Z’ for key generation.
Acc_X0
Acc_Y0
Acc_Z0
0
B@
1
CA ¼ R
Acc_x
Acc_y
Acc_z
0
B@
1
CA (1)
3.1.2. Temporal alignment
Temporal synchronization is necessary because different devices sample acceleration values
independently. We adopt an event-based mechanism in which devices detect the time point of
a heel-strike event, and use this event to trigger data collection. This method is based on the
fact that the acceleration data along gravity direction reach the peak simultaneously when the
foot touches the ground, and time delays in signal transmission through the body are negligi-
ble. In order to detect this event, we apply a low-pass filter on acceleration data Acc_X’ to
reduce noise. The cut-off frequency is 3 Hz as we find the normal step frequency lies between
1.6–2.8 Hz [6]. Then the local peaks are detected to indicate heel-strike events as we can see
from Figure 5.
The proposed method eliminates the requirement of explicit synchronization as heel-strike
events can be detected locally at each device without communication. When Alice receives a
ACK message from Bob, they both reach an agreement to record acceleration data from the
next i-th heel-strike event and stop recording at the subsequent j-th event. Then the accelera-
tion samples are processed by spatial alignment to the same coordinate system.
Figure 5. The peak along gravity direction indicates a heel strike on the ground.
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3.2. Key generation
3.2.1. Quantization
Our goal is to extract exactly the same cryptographic key if and only if two devices are on the
same body. Figure 6 plots the acceleration of two legitimate devices and an adversary device in
three directions. Due to the fact that acceleration values of two devices on the same body are
not identical as shown in Figure 6, the key generation algorithm must have the ability to map
even similar sequences to the same key and less similarity to different keys. The key generation
method is applied on two legitimate devices separately.
After signal alignment, we obtain acceleration values along three directions: Acc_X’, Acc_Y’
and Acc_Z’. To generate keys, we perform low-pass filtering and quantization for the acceler-
ation values in these three directions independently. As the first step, we use a low-pass filter
to filter out environmental noise. The cutoff frequency is chosen as 10 Hz as the useful
frequency of human motion lies below 10 Hz. After filtering, the acceleration values are
normalized to have zero mean and unit length to eliminate the impact of different positions.
Bits are obtained by applying the bit generation approach in [7, 8]. In the proposed system, we
segment the acceleration sequence with a moving window with no overlap (window size
W = 10). We then calculate two thresholds q + and q- within each window:
qþ ¼ uþ α∗δ, q ¼ u α∗δ (2)
where u and δ are the mean and standard deviation of acceleration values in a window. After
obtaining q + and q, we generate bits by the following rule: the acceleration values which are
> q + are encoded as bit 1, and values that are < q_- are encoded as bit 0. Finally, we combine
the bits generated from each window together to form a bit string. Figure 7 illustrates the
quantization process in a window in detail.
After the above steps, we obtain three separate bit strings K_G, K_F, K_S. We concatenate these
three bit strings together to form the initial key for Alice K_Alice = [K_G, K_F,K_S]. On Bob’s
side, he will perform the same quantization process to get K_Bob.
Figure 6. Acceleration along three directions.
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3.2.2. Reconciliation process
After key generation, we often get K_Alice≈K_Bob in practice because of noise. In this section, we
describe reconciliation process which is used to correct the mismatches between Alice and Bob.
Themain reason causingmismatches is that the samples discarded during quantization at Alice’s
side may be different from Bob’s side. In order to correct the mismatches, they are required to
exchange their sequence of sample indexes during reconciliation process. In this step, only the
bits corresponding to common sample indexes are reserved by Alice and Bob to obtain the
common key. For example, let us assume Alice and Bob each has 10 measurements in a window.
After key generation, Alice obtains “01100” and Bob yields “0110”. The length of these two keys
is not required to be same because they may discard different number of acceleration samples
during quantization. If we assume Alice generates bits at positions 1, 3, 5, 6 and 9, respectively.
She sends L_Alice = [1, 3, 5, 6, 9] to Bob. Bob checks his own position information and finds the
bits are generated at positions 1, 2, 5 and 9. He sends L_Bob = [1, 2, 5, 9] back to Alice. Then they
use the bits at positions 1, 5 and 9 to generate the same key as K_Alice’ = K_Bob’ = “010.”
3.2.3. Privacy amplification process
Because walking is a repetitive activity, different steps may have high correlation, thus
decreasing the randomness of the key. This problem can be addressed by privacy amplification
process. In the proposed system, we use XOR function to achieve this goal. Specifically, we
interleave the bit streams from three directions in time sequence and segment the concatenated
keys into small windows with no overlap. We then perform XOR operation on two consecutive
windows together to obtain the final key which are denoted by K_Alice” and K_Bob”.
Another function of privacy amplification is that it diminishes the partial information revealed
to Eve. Because in the reconciliation stage, Alice and Bob exchange messages over an authen-
ticated public channel and the publicly exchanged messages reveal a certain amount of infor-
mation about the bit strings to Eve. Note that other privacy amplification methods such as
universal hash [9] can be employed to further enhance the randomness of the concatenated
key. We refer the reader to [9] for more details.
Figure 7. Quantization process.
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4. Performance evaluation
In this section, we present the evaluation results. The aims of the evaluation are twofold: (1) to
evaluate the impact and performance of different parameters such as the window size (W), α in
quantization process, sampling frequency (F_s); (2) to evaluate the performance of different
components in the system which includes reconciliation process and privacy amplification.
4.1. Data acquisition
We collected a set of accelerometer data from 20 subjects (14 males and 6 females) wearing
smart devices on different locations of their body. As can be seen from Figure 8, the body
positions involved in the data collection include head, chest, waist and wrist. These positions
represent the common locations of mobile devices such as smartwatch and medical sensors
(e.g. pacemaker). During the data acquisition, the sampling rate of all smart wearable devices
is 100 Hz.
During data acquisition, the participants were asked to wearmobile devices as shown in Figure 8
and walk for about 5 minutes in their normal speed (0.7–1.1 m/s). We collect data from both
indoor and outdoor environments to capture different terrains in real-world scenarios. It is worth
mentioning that we do not consider the influence of different days or different walking speeds
Figure 8. Data acquisition.
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(slow, normal and fast) because all the devices worn by the subject are measuring the same gait
signal simultaneously, which is different from the data collection requirement in the study of gait
recognition [10]. The detected peaks that indicate heel strikes are used to synchronize accelera-
tion samples recorded on different wearable devices and segment steps. For each device attached
on one subject, we segment the acceleration sequences into small windows based on heel-strike
points. In this experiment, each window contains 10 steps. Then these windows are passed to the
system to generate final keys and evaluate the following metrics.
Three metrics are selected to quantitatively evaluate the performance:
• Bit agreement rate. Bit agreement rate denotes the percentage of matching bits in keys
generated by two parties. This metric evaluates the potential that two parties (either two
legitimate devices or a legitimate and an adversary device) can generate the same key.
• Bit rate. Bit rate denotes the number of bits generated in unit time, measured in bits per
second (bps). This metric evaluates how fast the system can generate a secret key.
• Entropy. Entropy denotes randomness in generated keys. This metric measures the
amount of information contains in each bit.
To evaluate the influence of different parameters on the system performance, we first conduct
a systematic exhaustive search to find the optimal combination. We vary the respective param-
eters within a dedicated range, i.e. F_s = 10, 20, 30, 50, 100, α = 0, 0.1,…, 1, andW = 5, 10,…, 50.
After this step, we find the best parameters combination is F_s = 30, α = 0.8 and W = 10. Then
we take turns to evaluate the influence of each parameter on system performance by setting
the other two parameters to the optimal value.
As mentioned above, each subject has acceleration samples recorded from five different body
parts. For each body part of one subject, we compute the bit agreement rate of legitimate
devices by using keys generated from other locations on the same body. We show the results
of the average values and 95% confidence level of the performance metrics (bit agreement rate
and bit rate).
4.2. Influence of sampling rate
In this experiment, we evaluate the influence of different sampling rate by downsampling F_s
from 100 to 50 Hz, 30, 20 and 10 Hz, respectively. The impact of F_s on bit rate and bit
agreement rate are plotted in Figure 9, respectively. We find that sampling rate has a negative
impact on the agreement rate between legitimate devices. After looking into the data, we find
this is because a higher sampling rate is able to record more acceleration values during the
same time window and thus increase bit rate; however, it reduces bit agreement as a higher
sampling rate captures acceleration variation more precisely which results in more mismatches
between legitimate devices.
4.3. Influence of parameter α
The parameter α in quantization phase determines the trade-off between agreement rate and
bit rate. In this experiment, we will evaluate the influence of α. As we can see from Figure 10,
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the bit rate drops when α increases. This is because the parameter α in Eq. (2) determines the
guard band which affects the inclusion or exclusion of acceleration samples. A larger α means
we will discard more acceleration samples. This will reduce the bit rate. On the other hand, as
we can see from Figure 10, the bit agreement rate increases with the growth of α because more
mismatches are excluded. In the meantime, we observe that parameter α has inverse impact on
agreement rate for an adversary device. This is because more samples are discarded for
quantization at all the devices when α increases. Therefore, the legitimate devices know the
index numbers used and they exchange the index list during reconciliation, so the agreement
rate increases. However, for an attacker, she does not know which samples are kept because
the signal values itself are different from that of legitimate devices, the remaining bits after
discarding more acceleration measurements in quantization will have less bit agreement rate.
In addition to sampling rate and α, we also evaluated the influence of window size in the
proposed system. We found that the moving window sizeW does not have much influence on
the system performance and we set the moving window size to 10 for the proposed system.
4.4. Influence of reconciliation process
As described in Section 3.2.2, reconciliation process is necessary because it is used to reduce the
mismatches between two parties. Figure 11 shows the influence of reconciliation process on
the bit rate and agreement rate. We can see a significant improvement in bit agreement rate
Figure 9. Influence of sampling rate.
Figure 10. Impact of α.
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after employing reconciliation approach. However, we also notice that the drawback of recon-
ciliation approach used in our system is that it will reduce bit rate. Recall that the main goal of
our system is to generate the same key; therefore, reconciliation is a necessary part of the
proposed key extraction system.
4.5. Impact of privacy amplification
As mentioned in Section 3.2.3, privacy amplification is used to improve the randomness of the
final key. In this experiment, we investigate if the XOR function in privacy amplification
achieves this goal. Figure 12 compares the entropy of the final key before and after privacy
amplification. We find that the distribution of entropy is closer to 1 after XOR operation. We
also notice that the entropy of the final keys varies from 0.93 to 1 which suggests that the
proposed key generation protocol can generate secret keys with good entropy. It is worth
mentioning that one disadvantage of using XOR function is that the bit rate will be reduced
by a factor of 2 because we XOR two consecutive windows together. From the results in
Figure 11, we find that the final bit rate can still reach 26 bit/sec after reconciliation and privacy
amplification process. State-of-the-art cryptographic algorithms such as AES require a key
Figure 11. Influence of reconciliation.
Figure 12. Impact of privacy amplification.
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length with at least 128 bits; therefore, our method takes about 5 s to generate a secure key
(about 10 steps).
4.6. Evaluation of key randomness
The generated keys will be used for encryption and decryption; therefore, we need to guaran-
tee that the generated keys are random. In this experiment, we apply the NIST suite of
statistical tests to evaluate the randomness of the final keys generated from our dataset. The
final results of NIST statistical test are p-values of different random test processes. If p-values
are greater than 0.01, it indicates the bit string is generated by a random process. Otherwise, if
p-values are below 0.01, the key is not random. From Table 1, we can see that the p-values are
all greater than 1% which indicates the generated keys from our method are random.
5. System implementation
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed key generation protocol on mobile
devices, we have prototyped the proposed scheme on Motorola Moto E2, a state-of-the-art
mobile phone. The complete key generation scheme is implemented in Java. The sampling rate
of accelerometer is set as 30 Hz, and Bluetooth low energy (BLE) functionality is employed for
wireless communication. BLE is designed to provide significantly lower power consumption
for devices with low power requirements, such as pacemaker. Therefore, BLE is well suited for
the proposed key generation protocol. Moreover, devices working under BLE broadcasting
mode do not need to be paired together beforehand.
BLE is designed to provide significantly lower power consumption for devices with low power
requirements. It introduces a new feature called peripheral mode, in which the data source can
advertise and publish data without requiring to pair with the data requestor beforehand. BLE
peripheral mode is designed for devices with resource-constraint and need to publish new
data frequently. Therefore, we run the system in peripheral mode and advertise the data using
broadcast packets. Bob organizes its data using Generic Attribute Profile (GATT) and encrypts
NIST test p-values
Frequency 0.606072
FFT test 0.562699
Longest run 0.027173
Linear complexity 0.386887
Block frequency 0.984496
Cumulative sums 0.974180
Approximate entropy 0.995898
Nonoverlapping template 0.302941
Table 1. NIST test results.
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the data to publish by AES. All the devices nearby including adversaries can receive the
broadcast advertisements and read the public-available data from Bob. However, only Alice
on the same body can generate the same key for data decryption. In this way, the private data
is protected from reading by unauthorized devices.
We implement our protocol on two Moto E2 smartphones and use one of them to simulate
pacemaker (Bob), the other one is used as smartphone (Alice) to request data from pacemaker.
Both Alice and Bob work under BLE broadcasting mode. The main interface of Alice has a UI
button that can be pressed by a user to trigger pairing process. After a user presses the start
button on Alice, Alice and Bob follow the steps presented in Figure 3 to generate a shared
secret key. If the length of the final key is greater than 128, only the first 128 bits are considered.
After obtaining a 128-bit length cryptographic key, Bob encrypts the heart rate measurement
(simulated measurement) by Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and broadcast the encrypted
message. Although several nearby devices including adversaries can listen to the broadcast
packets, only Alice can generate the same key and decrypt the messages.
Table 2 presents the system overhead (computation time and energy consumption) of our
system on Moto E2. The computation time and energy consumption are computed by averag-
ing the results from 50 trials. The computation time is obtained from the console of Android
studio. The energy consumption is profiled by E = PT, where P is the average power and T is
the running time of the profiled component. The average power P = Current *Voltage, where the
Current and Voltage of the battery is obtained via Android APIs. The results in Table 2 show
that the execution of the two stages in the protocol: signal processing and key generation take
an average time of 108.3 and 208.1 ms, respectively. When the scheme is fully employed, the
computation time and energy consumption are 316.8 ms and 85.6 mJ, respectively. Note that
heel-strike detection is applied on the continuous acceleration samples to detect heel-strike
events. Therefore, the processing time and energy consumption are not applicable in Table 2.
These results demonstrate the proposed key generation protocol has a low system overhead
and can run in real time on modern mobile devices.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose and implement a key generation protocol that exploits the acceler-
ation data produced by walking to establish a common cryptographic key between two
Computation time (ms) Energy consumption(mJ)
Signal processing 108.3 72.7
Key generation 208.1 12.7
AES encryption 0.2 0.1
AES decryption 0.2 0.1
Total 316.8 85.6
Table 2. System overhead measured on Moto E2 smartphone.
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wearable devices. Our protocol obtains a security advantage from the fact that different people
have distinctive walking styles. We performed extensive experiments to evaluate the perfor-
mance of our proposed system and demonstrate that the proposed key generation protocol is
able to establish a 128-bit length key in about 5 s (about 10 steps). We also prototyped the
proposed scheme on Motorola E2 smartphone to demonstrate the feasibility of our system on
mobile devices.
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